



Juvenile and family courts in most states1 have jurisdiction over
youths who have committed offenses (staying out late, disobeying
parents, running away, truancy) illegal only for persons under a
specified age, usually sixteen. 2 Nationwide, at least one-quarter of all
juvenile adjudications are for these offenses3 and studies suggest that
forty to fifty percent of all incarcerated minors are charged with such
noncriminal misbehavior.
4
Statutes have long proscribed this misbehavior. Such statutes
typically list these offenses in general terms6 as one of the many forms
1. See Comment, "Delinquent Child": A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR
L. REV. 352, 369-71 (1969) (a useful survey of state laws in this area, including several
pages of comparative tables); I. Solet, Report on State Laws Concerning Detention of
Children, September 1973 (unpublished report of Yale Legis. Serv. in Yale Law Library).
2. New York, for instance, commences jurisdiction at birth and terminates it at 16.
N.Y. FAMILY CT. Aar § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973-74). Indiana terminates juris-
diction at 18. IND. CODE § 31-5-7-4 (1971).
3. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 4 (1967).
4. Klapmuts, Children's Rights: The Legal Rights of Minors in Conflict with Law
or Social Custom, 4 CRIME AND DFLINq. LIT. 449, 470 (1972); cf. Downey, Why Children
Are in Jail, 17 CHILDREN 21 (1970).
5. Such laws have been traced to early colonial concerns with the child's key role
as a source of labor for the family economic unit. See Sidman, The Massachusetts
Stubborn Child Law: Law and Order in the Home, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 33 (1971). One 1646
Massachusetts statute, for example, authorized the death penalty for a son's diso-
bedience to his parents. Katz & Schroeder, Disobeying a Father's Voice: A Comment on
Commonwealth v. Brasher, 57 MAss. L.Q. 43 (1972).
6. Many of the statutes are aimed at behavior that is "ungovernable" or "incor-
rigible," N.Y. FAMILY GT. ACT § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973-74), or at a youth "guilty
of indecent or immoral conduct," IND. CODE § 31-5-7-4(16) (1971), or at one who "deports
himself so as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others."
Id. § 31-5-7.4(17). Recent constitutional challenges have been made to such wording
on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague. See Note, Parens Patriae and
Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745 (1973). The Supreme Court,
without reaching the substantive issues, recently remanded such a challenge for recon-
sideration. Maillard v. Gonzalez, 42 U.S.L.W. 3583 (U.S., Apr. 16, 1974). In New York,
the statute proscribing such behavior has survived a vagueness attack, at least in the
state courts. See In re A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 283 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972); cf.
Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972).
But see In re B., No. J.1365-73 (D.C. Super. Ct., June 14, 1973) (holding such a statute
unconstitutionally vague). Even were such wording declared void for vagueness by the
high court, however, states could still retain the ungovernability jurisdiction. A re-
cently enacted Pennsylvania statute demonstrates the ease with which ungovernability
jurisdiction apparently may be insulated from vagueness challenges:
"Delinquent act" means: . . . (ii) a specific act or acts of habitual disobedience of
the reasonable and lawful commands of his parent, guardian, or other custodian
committed by a child who is ungovernable.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Supp. 1973-74). This Note questions the wisdom,
not the constitutionality, of such statutes.
1383
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 83: 1383, 1974
of "delinquent" activity.7 In the early 1960's, however, New York8
and California9 rewrote their juvenile laws to separate noncriminal
from criminal offenders by creating a new noncriminal category.
This change rested on the assumption that youths who engaged in
such noncriminal misbehavior needed and could benefit from court
involvement,'0 and that this benefit could be greatly increased were
the stigma'1 of "delinquency" eliminated and additional services pro-
vided in connection with a new classification.' 2 The new creation
thus represented a fresh affirmation of the juvenile court's traditional
efforts at "salvation."' 3 As one advocate wrote, "In this class of cases
there is no need for judicial power, as in the case of crimes, in order
to protect the community . . . . The goal is only to help the
child .... 14
The term chosen for noncriminal juvenile offenders was "persons
in need of supervision" (PINS). In the 12 years since its formulation,
the New York PINS statute has spawned a host of related statutes
protecting juveniles, variously termed MINS (minors otherwise in
7. In 1901 noncriminal misbehavior was added as an element of delinquency in the
Illinois juvenile court act, the nation's first. Law of May 11, 1901, [1901] 111. Laws
141, 142, amending Law of April 21, 1899, [1899] Ill. Laws 131. However, "punishment
for such crimes pre-dated the Act." Schultz, Book Review, 82 YALE L.J. 629, 632 (1973).
For a discussion of 19th century juvenile law, see J. HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SO-
CIETY (1971); R. PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF JUVENILE REFORM IN NEw
YORK STATE 1815-1857 (1969); A. PLATT, THE CHILD S.VERS: THE INVENTION OF DELIN-
QUENCY (1969).
8. See N.Y. FAMmY CT. Acr §§ 711-84 (McKinney 1963).
9. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1966), as amended, CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1972).
10. The need for special treatment for children who do not obey their parents is
predicated upon the existence of a "competence differential" between adults and
youths. Indeed, early reformers of the law's jurisdiction over juveniles assumed the
"natural dependence of adolescents and created a special court to further it." A. PLATr,
supra note 7, at 176.
11. Cf. note 116 infra.
12. See N.Y. JT. LEcIS. COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, REPORT, pt. 2, at 7 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as 1962 COMM. REP.].
But the Association of the Bar of the City of New York expressed doubt "whether
this change in labeling will have the intended beneficial effect:" N.Y.C. BAR ASS'N
SPECIAL COMM. ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS, REPORTS ON THE FAMILY
COURT AcT PROPOSED BY THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON COURT REORGANIZA-
TION 23 (1962).
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 50, 62 A. 198, 199 (1905), the most
frequently cited rejection of constitutional challenges to the establishment of a separate
juvenile jurisdiction: "[The Act] is not for the punishment of offenders, but for the
salvation of children .... ." Cf. the classic theoretical statement of the goals of the
juvenile court in Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). Mack con-
cludes, "[t]he problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl
committed a wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had
best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career." Id. at 119-20.
14. Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment in New York: Juvenile Cases in the New
Family Court, 48 CORNELL L. REV. 499, 506 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Dembitz].
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need of supervision) 1 and CHINS (children in need of supervision). 16
It continues to serve as a model for reform.1
7
The PINS statute gives the state jurisdiction over any person
less than 16 years of age "who does not attend school in accord
with the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education
law or who is incorrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient
and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority."' 8
Though anyone may initiate PINS proceedings,' PINS cases often
involve a petition brought by school officials alleging truancy20 or,
more frequently, an "ungovernability" petition brought by parents
alleging some form of youthful disobedience in such matters as asso-
ciates, hours, sexual activity, language, general behavior, and residence
(running away).21 The discussion that follows will evaluate the present
functioning of the "ungovernability" element in the New York PINS
statute to determine whether it provides a less detrimental alternative
than no court involvement at all for ungovernable youths.22
Case surveys and court observation 2 3 demonstrate that, in fact, the
15. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
16. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(10)(a) (Supp. 1973-74).
17. Massachusetts recently revised its laws to produce a procedure analogous to that
of New York by creating a category called "child in need of services." MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 119, § 21 (9 Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 1073, § 3 (1973). New Jersey followed a PINS
model in creating the category of "juvenile in need of supervision." N.J. REv. STAT.
ch. 306, . 4 (5 Sess. Law Serv. (1973).
18. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973-74).
19. N.Y. FA ILY CT. ACT § 733(a)-(d) (McKinney 1963).
20. School officials bring 25 percent of PINS petitions. AD.tix. BD. OF N.Y. Jun. CoNr.,
REPORT FOR JUDICIAL YEAR 1972-73, at 331 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Jun. CONF. REP.].
21. Parents or parental surrogates bring 59 percent of PINS petitions. Id. For pur-
poses of this Note, "ungovernability" is defined to encompass all cases initiated by
parents. As the term properly suggests, such cases are always initiated by a dispute
over whether the wishes of parent or child are to govern the youth's behavior.
Unrelated individuals, police, and various institutions account for the remaining 16
percent of petitions.
22. This standard is similar to that suggested in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNiT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53-64 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTIN],
that juvenile courts attempt to serve not the "best interests" of the child but rather
to find the "least detrimental alternative" available. Such a standard would "serve
to remind decisionmakers that their task is to salvage as much as possible out of an
unsatisfactory situation . . [and] reduce the likelihood of their becoming enmeshed
in the hope and magic associated with 'best' which often leads them into believing
that they have greater power for doing 'good' than 'bad.'" Id. at 63. It is wise for
policymakers as well as decisionmakers in this area to use such a standard; it serves
as a reminder that a legislator deciding on the existence of ungovernability juris-
diction is weighing two alternatives, neither of which can be fully satisfactory.
23. The discussion of the current state of the ungovernability jurisdiction, unless
otherwise noted, stems from a summer of personal observation and interviews by
the authors and from a survey of some 265 PINS case histories (including 129 un-
governability cases) in New York and Rockland counties of New York State. In New
York County a 10 percent random sample of 1972 PINS cases was selected; in Rock-
land County all 1972 PINS cases were examined. The two PINS samples are nearly
identical in size. New York has a greater percentage of ungovernability cases than
Rockland (69 percent to 33 percent) and thus makes a proportionately greater con-
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purpose of the ungovernability jurisdiction is being subverted in two
ways. First, the court processes as ungovernable some youths who are
in fact either "neglected" or "delinquent" in statutory terms and who
should be processed under the provisions governing persons in those
categories. Second, in ungovernability cases the family court allows
itself to be used by angry parents to punish their children. Moreover,
the ungovernability jurisdiction often fails to carry out its purpose:
discerning and meeting the "needs" of a youth who is in conflict with
an affectionate, nonneglecting parent.
These failures can be traced to judges' inability to exercise the
jurisdiction's vast discretion over youths without extensive, if unwit-
ting, abuse. Abolition of the jurisdiction would be a less detrimental
alternative for the youths involved than any form of its continuation.
I. Background: The Statute's Structure and Scope
Approximately seven thousand ungovernability cases are processed
each year in New York State.2 4 The youths alleged to be ungovern-
tribution of cases to the ungovernability sample. Totals reflect approximate propor-
tions for the state as a whole. Because of the different sampling proportions in the
two counties percentages rather than absolute numbers are the significant measures
in the analysis presented in this Note. The two counties are similar on most measures.
Significant differences are noted throughout. Where the actual number of cases in
particular categories is small, numerical data are provided and caution is indicated
in making generalizations.
Observations were carried out pursuant to an organized research strategy. The au-
thors observed every stage of court and probation processing of cases, including in-
take interviews, courtroom activity, and discussions in a judge's chambers. Observations
were recorded after the event and were later checked for accuracy in interviews.
See Maccoby & Maccoby, The Interview: A Tool of Social Science, 1 HANDBOOK OF
Soc. Psvcn. 449 (G. Lindzey ed. 1954). Accuracy was also checked in further obser-
vations. See Becker, Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observations, 23
AM. Soc. REV. 652 (1958). Because of the nature of the observations and the need to
preserve confidentiality, many conclusions in this Note can be documented only by
reference to the authors' experience.
The authors wish to thank Family Court Administrative Judge Florence Kelley and
Director of Probation John A. Wallace of New York County and Family Court Ad-
ministrative Judge Robert J. Stolarik and Juvenile Probation Supervisor Michael
Frenchak of Rockland County and their staffs for the records that were made avail-
able for our inspection and for the kind assistance that was extended to us. In
addition, the authors wish to thank the Yale Law School for supporting computer
analyses of our data and to express gratitude to the Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion-American Bar Association Juvenile justice Standards Project, and its Director,
J. Lawrence Schultz, who sponsored our work.
24. This figure includes all those cases which are brought to intake, including those
adjusted there. See p. 1388 infra. Cases of the latter sort are considered in this
Note because they too have substantial consequences for the youth's life: Time is
occupied, behavior probed, and, frequently, the youth is led to accept "voluntary"
counseling under the threat of being sent to court in the future.
The numerical estimate in the text is derived by adding to the figure of 8,113 PINS
petitions brought in New York State in fiscal year 1973 (JUD. CONF. REP., supra note
20, at 329) an estimated 5,400 cases adjusted at intake (based on an extrapolation
from our finding that approximately 40 percent of PINS cases are adjusted, never
petitioned and thus not counted in official statistics) to yield a total of about 13,500
cases. In our study, ungovernability cases represented at least 55 percent of these.
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able are overwhelmingly in midadolescence; sixty-eight percent are
over 14 and 44 percent are over 15.25 They are predominantly girls
28
and a majority are nonwhite.27 Many of these youths have been
brought to court before.28 Their families are frequently broken,29
large,30 and poor.31
The parental complainant 2 initiates an ungovernability case by
presenting various allegations of juvenile misbehavior 33 to a member
25. The percentages of cases in the sample increase with the age of the youths
involved. Only 5 percent of the cases involve youths under eleven, 9 percent involve
youths eleven to thirteen, 19 percent involve youths thirteen to fourteen, and 24
percent involve youths fourteen to fifteen, and as noted in the text, 44 percent are
over fifteen.
26. Girls constitute 62 percent of cases. The girls tend to be older than the boys.
Several youths over sixteen were brought to court; all were female.
27. Black youths are involved in 40 percent of the cases; white youths in 31
percent and Hispanic youths in 28 percent. Thirty-five of the 44 black cases (and all
of the Hispanic cases) occurred in New York, while 29 of the 34 cases involving
whites occurred in Rockland. Information on race was not available in twenty cases.
28. Thirty-two percent have some previous court contact including, at a minimum,
official contact with the court's Intake Unit. Of these, 18 percent had previous court
contact on ungovernability matters. Thus nearly one in five has prior court involve-
ment as an allegedly ungovernable youth.
29. Thirty-three percent live in family units where both parents are present. Fifty-
two percent live in homes where the mother is present but the father is absent;
five percent live in homes where the father is present but the mother is absent;
seven percent live with other relatives; two percent live with friends; and two percent
live with guardians or foster parents. In 27 cases the youth lives with a single
parental custodian whose household also includes some other adults. In four cases grand-
parents are present, in 19 cases a stepfather or paramour lives with the family, and
in four cases a stepmother or girlfriend lives with the family.
30. The average number of siblings in the household where the youth lives is
three. When the youth and an average of 1.5 adults (approximately 48 percent of
youths live in a one adult household and 52 percent in a two adult household) are
added to this total, the average size of households for youths charged with ungovern-
ability is 5.5 persons. Siblings in such families have a high level of court contact.
In 53 percent of the cases there was previous family court involvement on juvenile
matters (the actual figure is probably higher for total family court involvement, since
many of the parents have been involved in support and other adult cases over which
the family court has jurisdiction).
31. The average family income is $5,357. Thirty-six percent of these families re-
ceive welfare payments. Whites are clearly wealthier; 83 percent of whites for whom
income figures are recorded have family incomes over $5,000, while 60 percent of blacks
and 53 percent of Hispanics have incomes greater than this amount. None of the
whites, 43 percent of the blacks and 61 percent of the Hispanics receive welfare pay-
ments. These figures are derived primarily from New York County, since income
data is largely unavailable in Rockland County. The existing data from Rockland
County indicates that the average family income in ungovernability cases is higher
there than in New York.
32. Mothers are complainants in 75 percent of ungovernability cases, fathers in 16
percent, and parental surrogates (usually other relatives) in 9 percent.
33. See col. 1 of Appendix A infra for the percentage (and number) of cases in
which the complainant makes different allegations at intake. Short runaway, defined
as a runaway in which the youth is absent for less than a week (in contrast to long
runaways when the youth is absent for more than one week), is the most frequent
allegation; it appears in just over half of the cases. The next most frequent is re-
fusal to obey, appearing in 47 percent of cases. Truancy, staying out later than the
parents desire, and having companions whom parents find objectionable (the last
category includes both undesirable companion cases in general and cases in which
specific objection is made to a girl's boyfriend) are all of major concern, for they
appear in more than one-third of all cases. Allegations which were not categorized
(classified as "other" in the sample) appear frequently and include such matters as
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of the intake unit of the probation department located in the court
building.34 An effort at voluntary35 adjustment follows if it appears
that the court would have jurisdiction. 6 This "intake procedure" is
intended to "sift out cases not requiring judicial action." 37 Some
46 percent of ungovernability cases are so adjusted, while the remain-
ing 54 percent are referred on to court.38
Formal court action is inaugurated at this time when the parent 9
files a petition4 0 setting forth the allegations41 of the youth's mis-
refusing to bathe regularly, having an abortion against parental wishes, sleeping all
day, refusing to do household chores, being selfish and self-centered, banging a door
in reaction to a parental command, wanting to get married, attempting suicide, and
being an "invertebrate [sic] liar."
Some 36 percent of cases include explicit allegations of behavior that would be
criminal (a felony, misdemeanor, or violation) if committed by an adult; especially
notable is the high percentage of allegations of drug usage. Explicit allegations of
sexual misbehavior appear in 21 percent of cases, mostly against girls.
34. The Family Court Act does not specifically create intake units. The act
permits "rules of court" to authorize the probation department to carry out the intake
and adjustment procedure. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 734 (McKinney 1963). The pro-
bation departments themselves have established structurally separate units to carry
out this task.
35. The informal adjustment procedure is designed to be voluntary in that pro-
bation's screening "may not prevent any person who wishes to file a petition . . .
from having access to the court." Id. § 734(b).
Some commentators on the New York Family Court Act have questioned whether it
is appropriate to permit insistent complainants to begin a formal action over the ob-
jection of the intake officer. Judge Dembitz notes that "some of the juvenile court
acts have dispensed with this assurance of access to judicial process." See Dembitz,
supra note 14, at 515.
36. Adjustment efforts can only extend for an initial period of two months, how-
ever, and then may be extended an additional thirty days only with the judge's per-.
mission. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 734(c) (McKinney 1963). Information gained therein
may not be used at adjudication. Id. § 735.
37. Id. § 734, Comm. Comments.
38. Youths referred to court tend to be older; only 38 percent of adjusted youths
are over fifteen in contrast to 48 percent of youths referred to court. Males are more
likely to be referred to court; 59 percent of boys are referred to court, while only
51 percent of girls are so referred. By race, blacks are referred to court significantly
more (64 percent of all cases) than whites or Hispanics (53 percent and 52 percent
respectively). Youths who live with both parents are referred less frequently (48
percent of all cases) than youths who live with one parent or with parental surrogates
(56 percent). See col. 2 of Appendix A for the percentages of youths who are charged
with each allegation and who are referred to court.
39. The petition complainants are represented in the following percentages: mothers,
75 percent; fathers, 13 percent; other relatives, 12 percent.
40. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 732 (McKinney 1963).
41. See col. 3 of Appendix A infra for the percentage (and number) of cases in
which typical allegations appear. The following allegations occur disproportionately often
among older youths: Sixty-nine percent of all short runaway allegations concern youths
over fourteen; 88 percent of long runaway allegations concern youths over fif-
teen. Eighty-nine percent of cases in which parents allege that the youth is as-
sociating with objectionable companions involve youths over fourteen and 67 percent
of these cases involve youths over fifteen. Seventy-five percent of cases in which parents
allege malicious mischief concern youths over fifteen. Likewise 71 percent of all assault
allegations are against youths over fifteen; eighty eight percent of drug possession
allegations are against youths over fourteen and 75 percent are against youths over
fifteen; one hundred percent of the robbery allegations are against youths over fourteen;
seventy-eight percent of the "other" allegations are against youths over fourteen and
56 percent concern youths over fifteen; and 100 percent of the allegations that a girl
spent the night with a boy are against girls who are over fifteen.
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behavior. 42 The respondent youth is then assigned a lawyer called a
"law guardian."
43
There follow a number of preliminary hearings at which warrants
may be issued,44 or detention may be ordered4" in secure facilities
or nonsecure shelters.46 Barring a withdrawal or dismissal at this
point,47 final decisions are reached by a bifurcated procedure.48 First
there is an adjudicatory hearing49 where the allegedly ungovernable
juvenile may either admit guilt or have a full trial, 50 at which the
By sex, girls receive a notably higher proportion of the following allegations than
their 57 percent representation in the sample of petitions as a whole: truancy, 62
percent; short runaway, 74 percent; long runaway, 73 percent; bad companions, 73
percent; drug possession, 60 percent; alcohol use, 67 percent; undesirable boyfriend,
100 percent; prostitution, 100 percent; promiscuity, 100 percent; cohabiting, 100 percent;
spending the night with a boy, 100 percent; general sex innuendo, 100 percent. Boys
strongly predominate (64 percent) in criminal allegations (which cluster in the older
age groups; 50 percent are against youths over 15) and in allegations of verbal mis-
behavior (71 percent).
42. A proper petition must allege three things: (a) that "the respondent is in-
corrigible, ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of
his parents, guardian or lawful custodian"; these must be substantiated by the spec-
ification of "the acts on which the allegations are based and the time and place
they allegedly occurred"; (b) that the respondent was under 16 years of age; and
(c) that the respondent requires "supervision or treatment." N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 732(a-c)
(McKinney 1963). In practice the petitions are printed forms requiring only that the
parent supply information about the respondent-youth, the complainant and the
details of the allegation of "ungovernability." Intake officers or court clerks, not the
complainants themselves, undertake the actual task of recording that information on
the forms.
43. Id. § 741. This provision was necessary, the drafting committee noted, because
"[t]he interests of the children and their parents are not always identical." 1962
CoMm. REP., supra note 12, at 3.
44. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 738 (McKinney 1963). If the respondent and the person
responsible for him do not appear after a summons, the court, may issue a warrant
directing that either or both be brought to court at a specified date and time. Id.
§ 725. Warrants are issued in 38 percent of ungovernability cases. In one case, eight
were issued.
45. Id. § 724. Detention is authorized in two instances: when there is a substantial
probability either that the youth will not appear in court again or that he would be
a danger to others. In 41 percent of the cases youths are detained.
46. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 720(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1973-74) states that a secure
facility is "characterized by physically restricting construction, hardware, and pro-
cedures." A nonsecure facility is "characterized by the absence of physically restricting
construction, hardware, and procedures." Id. § 720(a)(iii).
47. Some 59 percent of the cases are withdrawn or dismissed, though rates sig-
nificantly differ in the two counties (73 percent in New York, in Rockland only 29
percent). Cases may also, of course, be dismissed after an adjudication.
48. Cases average 78 days from intake to finding. In New York County the average
is 68 days; in Rockland it is 87 days.
49. N.Y. FAMILY Cr. AcT § 742 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74). This section defines an
adjudicatory hearing as one "to determine whether the respondent did the acts alleged
to show that he violated a law or is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually dis-
obedient and beyond the control of his parents, guardian or legal custodian."
50. Trials are extremely rare. Sixty-nine percent of the youths admit all the al-
legations, 24 percent admit some of them, and only 7 percent deny all allegations,
forcing a trial. Partial admissions are most frequent in New York, constituting 46
percent of all "pleas." Full admissions occur in 39 percent of New York cases and
there are denials in 15 percent. In Rockland, by contrast, 94 percent of the cases
involve full admissions, and 6 percent partial admissions; there were no denials.
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standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt."51 Subsequently,52
the law mandates a "dispositional hearing . . . to determine [by a
preponderance of the evidence 3] whether the respondent requires
supervision or treatment."54
Sixty-seven percent of the petitions are resolved in a "nonregulat-
ing" disposition, 55 withdrawal by the complaining parent, or dis-
missal by the judge. Under the general heading of "regulating" disposi-
tions,56 8 percent of the juveniles receive "informal supervision" 7
or a suspended judgment, which may impose various terms and con-
ditions on both parents and children for a period of one year, though
a judge may grant another year's extension in "exceptional circum-
stances."58 Another 10 percent are placed on probation.5 9 The terms
of probation may include mandatory contact with a probation officer
and a host of possible additional conditions, 0 which may be imposed
for a, period of one year (again a court may extend the period an-
51. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), extended the right to proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt to minors charged with committing a crime. New York is one of the
few states to have extended this right to ungovernable juveniles as well. In re E.,
68 Misc. 2d 487, 327 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Fain. Ct. 1971). However, not much need be proved
to meet the standard of "habitual" disobedience; there need only be proof that the
juvenile was involved in more than "a single isolated incident." In re W., 28 N.Y.2d
589, 590, 268 N.E.2d 642, 643, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (1971).
52. A confidential probation investigation of the youth's background and needs
usually intervenes between adjudication and disposition. N.Y. FAMLY Cr. ACT § 746(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1973-74) provides in addition that such reports "may not be fur-
nished to the court prior to the completion of a fact-finding hearing, but may be
used in a dispositional hearing." Because of the time necessary for the completion
of the required investigation and for probation to arrange a suitable disposition,
dispositions occur on the average more than two months after a finding. While on
the average 78 days elapse between intake and finding, on the aserage 143 days elapse
between intake and disposition.
53. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 745 (McKinney 1963).
54. Id. § 743. The formal dispositional determination is seldom controvertcd.
55. So termed because they involve no official regulation of the youth's subsequent
behavior. The percentage of such dispositions is very low in Rockland, representing
only 28 percent of the cases. In New York 83 percent of youths receive such dispositions.
56. So termed because each involves some sort of official supervision of the youth,
though degrees thereof may range from infrequent probation supervision to total
control in a training school.
57. In Rockland, 28 percent of youths receive such dispositions. In New York, no
youths are so treated. Informal supervision is not really a disposition at all; it is a
"freeze" of all action. After an admission, the court merely stays further proceedings
and instructs the probation department to handle the case as if it were one involving
informal probation, that is, as if the case had never come to court. Some judges
resort to this device if they feel that a case should not be in court at all, but are
nevertheless reluctant to dismiss for fear of embarrassing the intake officer.
58- N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr §§ 754(b), 755; Rule 7.5 (McKinney 1963).
59. In Rockland, 22 percent of the youths are placed on probation; in New York,
5 percent of the youths are so placed.
60. See N.Y. CT. R. § 2506.6 (McKinney 1973) for a list of possible terms, among
which are requirements that the youth obtain permission for any absence from the
county for over two weeks, obtain a job, submit records of scholastic achievement or
earnings and expenses, contribute to his own support, and refrain from driving a
motor vehicle.
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other year)."' The remaining 15 percent 62 receive some sort of "place-
ment" for longer periods of up to eighteen months; extensions are
possible at yearly intervals until the youth reaches age 18 (or, if the
youth consents, until age 20). 63 Youths may be placed with a relative,
a private agency, a state camp, the Commissioner of Social Services,
or-for those who are thought to need a structured, authoritarian
environment-in a training school 4 run by the State Division for
Youth.
II. The Failures
A. Jurisdictional Overreach: The Neglected and the
Delinquent as Ungovernable
In many of the thousands of cases processed each year, the purposes
of the statute are subverted because the statute is misapplied to
youths who are neglected or abused by their parents or are criminal
offenders ("juvenile delinquents"). More suitable legal classifications
and procedures are available for such youths.
In 37 percent of the cases, allegedly ungovernable youths are in fact
neglected. When processed, these neglected youths are more likely
61. N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT §§ 754(d), 757 (McKinney 1963).
62. In Rockland, the figure is 22 percent, while in New York it is 12 percent.
63. N.Y. FAMImY CT. Acr § 754(c) (McKinney 1963); § 756 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74).
64. Originally only delinquents were to be allowed in training schools. Act of Apr.
24, 1962, ch. 686, § 756, [1962] 2 N.Y. Laws 2301 (McKinney). As a "temporary"
measure, in 1963 some months after the Family Court Act was passed, an amendment
to it permitted incarceration of PINS in the training schools for a year. Act of Apr.
26, 1963, ch. 809, § 10, [1963] N.Y. Laws 1336 (McKinney), as amended, Act of Apr.
23, 1963, ch. 811, § 4, [1963] N.Y. Laws 1339 (McKinney). The legislature enacted
successive, temporary, one-year extensions. Act of Apr. 3, 1964, ch. 333, § 1, [1964]
N.Y. Laws 515 (McKinney); Act of Apr. 26, 1965, ch. 126, § 2, [1965] N.Y. Laws
190 (McKinney); Act of June 28, 1966, ch. 705, § 2, [1966] 1 N.Y. Laws 864 (McKinney).
In 1968, it made this provision permanent. Act of June 22, 1968, ch. 874, §§ 2-3,
[1968] 2 N.Y. Laws 1784 (McKinney), as amended, Act of June 25, 1971, ch. 947, § 10,
[1971] 2 N.Y. Laws 1524 (McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr
§ 756(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973-74)). In 1973, the Court of Appeals handed down an
unilluminating opinion prohibiting the incarceration of PINS in training schools for
delinquents. li re C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973). Now
segregated PINS-only and delinquent-only training schools have been established. Of-
fice of Children's Serv. of the N.Y. Jud. Conf., The PINS Child, A Plethora of Prob-
lems, November 1973, at 77 (available at Office of Children's Serv. of the N.Y. Jud.
Conf.) [hereinafter cited as OCS; Plethora].
65. A child was neglected for purposes of this Note if he could be processed under
the statute's current neglect subsection, N.Y. FAMiLY CT. Acr § 1012(f) (McKinney
Supp. 1973-74), which reads as follows:
(f) "Neglected child" means a child less than eighteen years of age
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in
imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent
or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care
(A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or education in
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to be referred to court and less likely to be adjusted than alleged un-
governables who are not neglected. 6 Once in court, they are more
likely to receive a finding 7 They also receive more regulating dis-
positions 8 and they receive a higher percentage of such highly regu-
lating dispositions as training school and placement. 9 Thus, not only
are many youths who are in fact neglected processed as ungovernable,
but the presence of parental neglect seems to encourage the court to
maintain control over a youth and to subject him to its full regulat-
ing power.7 0
Court personnel readily admit that a high percentage of neglect
cases are processed as ungovernable.71 Despite the option of treating
accordance with the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education
law or medical, dental, optometrical or surgical care, though financially able to
do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so; or
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by un-
reasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk
thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by using
a drug or drugs; or by using alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses
self-control of his actions; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature re-
quiring the aid of the court; or
(ii) who'has been abandoned by his parents or other person legally respon-
sible for his care.
Each ungovernability case was given an initial expansive coding for any indication
of neglect or abuse. All indications of neglect or abuse in the court and probation
records and agency and school reports were recorded in full.
The authors engaged in court observation of the processing of neglect cases. On
the basis of the actual processing standard derived from those observations, the au-
thors reviewed the information on each possible neglect case and re-rated it for the
presence or absence of statutory neglect. This detailed coding in light of the statutory
standard yielded far fewer neglect cases than had the initial designation. A relia-
bility check of the comparability of the authors' codings of statutory neglect indicated
agreement in more than 90 percent of all cases.
66. A recent study by the Office of Children's Services reached a similar conclusion.
OCS; Plethora, supra note 64, at 77. In our survey, 45 percent of the petitions filed
involved youths who could be denominated neglected, as compared with 37 percent
of the youths brought to intake.
67. Thus, 50 percent of the juveniles who receive a "finding"-are formally adjudi-
cated PINS-are in fact neglected, as compared with 45 percent of the youths against
whom petitions are filed.
68. Sixty percent of the neglected youths in ungovernability proceedings receive
nonregulating dispositions; 40 percent receive regulating dispositions. Seventy-one per-
cent of nonneglected youths in ungovernability cases receive nonregulating dispositions;
29 percent receive regulating dispositions.
69. Neglected youths receive 100 percent of all training school dispositions and 60
percent of all placements.
70. In addition to those cases which would meet the requirements of statutory
neglect, observation suggests that there are many cases in which the parents could be
characterized as having "rejected" their children. Judges agree. Interview with a judge
of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City, Aug. 16, 1973. Such cases have not been
included in the figures here.
71. Judges readily agree that "all PINS are neglected in some way." Interview
with a judge of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City, Jan. 17, 1974. Others note
that some of the PINS petitions before them "should have been . . neglect petition[s]
years ago." Interview with a judge of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City, Aug.
9, 1973.
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such cases as neglects, 72 they are handled as ungovernables because,
observation suggests, judges in many cases do not want to face the
delays and formalities that an accused parent and his or her lawyer
will create in a neglect proceeding.73 There is also a reluctance in
some cases to accuse an adult; it is simply easier to deal with a youth.
This practice of processing neglected youths as ungovernable may
be criticized for two reasons. First, many of the private agencies which
provide the best services available to the court are comparatively more
likely to accept youths labeled neglected than those labeled PINS.
74
Processing these youths as ungovernables limits their access to those
services. Second, it is unfair to accuse a youth in connection with a
matter in which fault, if it is to be placed,75 should be placed upon
the adult. Penalizing the youth-even if only in such hidden ways
as the greater stigma that attaches to being processed as ungovern-
ableT7-can only be detrimental to the youth's interests.
77
Another group of allegedly ungovernable youths, perhaps fifteen
to twenty percent, are accused of acts which would fall within the
statutory definition of delinquency:78 acts (most often assault and
72. N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT, § 716(b) (McKinney 1963) authorizes substitution of a
neglect for a PINS petition at any time upon the judge's own motion.
73. Such a conclusion is supported by similar observations on the part of law
guardians in New York. Interview with Law Guardian Steven Eisenberg, in New
York City, Aug. 30, 1973.
74. Telephone Interview with Polly Whitney, Social Worker, Juv. Rights Div. of
the Legal Aid Soc'y, N.Y. Family Ct., Mar. 20, 1974. See COMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE FAMILY Cr. IN N.Y.C., JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED:
PRETENSIONS AND REALIIES OF TREATMENT SERVICES 105 (1972): "Voluntary agencies
have increasingly accepted more dependent and neglected children .... ." The report
goes on to note that agency placement is most difficult for PINS when a child ap-
pears neglected and is in mid or late adolescence. All ungovernables are PINS, of course.
75. On this problem, Judge Dembitz's 1962 suggestion remains valid:
From the standpoint of statutory improvement, there perhaps should be a
device in the nature of a custody proceeding-blaming neither the child as
"ungovernable" or "delinquent" nor the parent, who may be exerting all his
abilities, as "neglectful"-to determine whether the child needs custody other
than parental.
Dembitz, supra note 14, at 508.
76. On stigma, see note 116 infra.
77. Nor can such a practice be defended by the assertion that many of these
y-ouths can be described as both "neglected" and "ungovernable," and can therefore
justifiably be processed as either. In addition to the policy objections to such a course,
legislative history strongly implies that, in overlap cases, the youth should be clas-
sified as neglected. See, e.g., NEW YORK FAMILY CT. ACT § 739 & Comm. Comments
(McKinney 1963), which state that when a parent causes a youth to be detained by
refusing to take him home, a neglect petition should be considered as a substitute
for the PINS petition.
78. This figure is an aggregation of all allegations of acts which could possibly
be considered crimes or violations if committed by an adult. Thirty-six percent of
the allegations at intake and 41 percent of the allegations in petitions could be so
characterized. However, in addition to major criminal allegations, these figures include
a number of acts which would be insufficient to sustain a delinquency petition, e.g.,
a youth allegedly throwing a rock or snowball at a neighbor's house. Though there is
no way to factor out such cases statistically, observation suggests that 15 or 20 percent
is a fair estimate of the cases in which delinquency allegations were sufficiently sub-
stantial for a court to take cognizance.
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drug possession) which would be criminal if committed by an adult30
The decision to process these potential delinquents as ungovernable
frequently represents a conscious determination by court personnel
to obtain dispositional power over a youth with the comparative ease
afforded by the ungovernability jurisdiction. 0 Such circumvention
of the goals and processes of handling criminal offenders"' is unfair to
the youths concerned and is a distortion of the purposes of the un-
governability jurisdiction.
B. Angry Parents-Pressured Decisions
Misapplication of the ungovernability statute occurs not only when
it is extended to encompass delinquent or neglected youths. It occurs
as well when the court, though confronting a conflict between a
nonneglecting parent and a noncriminal youth, allows itself to be
used by the parent to punish the child and fails to make an inde-
pendent determination of the youth's condition.
Animosity between parent and child is common in ungovern-
ability cases. A case is usually triggered by emotionally charged
struggles between a parent and a rapidly maturing adolescent. A
higher percentage of all parental complaints are made against those
over 15 years old than against any other age gwoup.82 Parental com-
plaints frequently mention such matters as refusal to obey, the youth's
friends, sexual activity, verbal behavior. Such issues often become a
79. N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 712(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973-74). These statistics also
include reports of harassment, which is currently a violation in New York but not
currently subject to process under the delinquency laws.
80. Delinquent youths in New York are processed through the Family Court much
as are PINS, but processing presents more obstacles for the court. Proof of delinquent
behavior is more difficult to obtain, though in both cases proof must be beyond a
reasonable doubt; in delinquency cases the petitioning party must prove that the youth
at a specific time committed a specific criminal act. In ungovernability cases, the
petitioning party need merely prove that the youth disobeyed his parents on some
occasions. See note 51 supra. The latter typically involves fewer witnesses than are
necessary in a delinquency proceeding and most if not all youths are guilty of some
such disobedience in the course of growing up. This perhaps explains why only 7
percent of ungovernability cases are actually tried, while observation suggests that
delinquency cases are tried four or five times as often (there is little or no plea
bargaining in the Family Court).
The possibility of incarceration in delinquency-only training schools as a conse-
quence of a delinquency proceeding (see note 64 supra) may also be a source of the
vociferous opposition they evoke.
81. In one typical case a boy's mother filed a petition against him. The boy, it
turned out, was an addict and the court mentioned the need for careful handling
of this drug "pusher." Under questioning, the judge informed the authors that she
was convinced that the child had violated penal statutes for selling heroin, "but if
we have to prove this, it requires exact evidence that on such and such a date, at
6:02 p.m., he did such and such," a proof burden easily avoided under ungovern-
ability jurisdiction. Interview with a judge of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City,
July 24, 1973.
82. See p. 1387 & note 25 supra.
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test of wills in which the question of "saving face" plays no small
part.
3
A parent who arrives at intake is often irate and hostile, 4 a state
that is aggravated by the admission of inadequacy which is implicit
in a parent's seeking help from the court.sa Parents frequently recite
a flood of allegations to the intake officer.86 While the officer may
attempt to adjust matters and may even have a commendable success
rate with the less insistent, 7 often he simply acquiesces to a parental
desire to see the youth in court.88
83. Allegations at intake include a iefusal to obey in 47 percent of the cases; late
hours in 36 percent of the cases, staying out overnight in 19 percent of the cases,
short runaways (less than one week) in 51 percent of the cases, long runaways (more
than one week) in 13 percent of the cases, unacceptable speech in 21 percent of the
cases, and undesirable friends in 14 percent of the cases. The other frequent allegation
is truancy, which appears in 43 percent of cases. Strong emotional commitments on
both sides often underlie such allegations. Other allegations which evidence contro-
versies between parent and child but which fit none of these categories were rep-
resented in some 21 percent of the cases. See note 33 supra. More ungovernability
cases are brought against girls than against boys. While 53 percent of all youths brought
to intake are girls, 62 percent of all ungovernability cases at intake are girls. Parental
complainants, it would appear, are more concerned about girls' behavior and set
stricter standards for them. This is especially so in cases (51 percent of ungovernability
cases involving girls) in which potential sexual involvements are alleged. Many judges
cite as the typical ungovernability case a battle between mother and daughter over
a "man." Interview with Administrative Judge Florence M. Kelley of the N.Y. Family
Ct., in New York City, Aug. 8, 1973.
84. After conducting three weeks of observations and interviews, an assistant gather-
ing information for the study reported: "All the I.O.'s [Intake Officers] spoken
with feel that PINS mothers are despicable. There's no doubt that they either con-
sciously or repressedly want to humiliate and punish their kids. It is most often the
mothers who are messed up and need some supervision .... "
85. Interview with Mr. Guy DiCosola, Branch Chief, Manhattan Intake of the
N.Y.C. Probation Dep't, in New York City, June 26, 1973.
86. Observation in Rockland County indicates that parents bring a "shopping list"
of charges to intake. If they feel that the intake officer is not sufficiently persuaded
of their desire to have the child brought to court, they will begin to recite additional
allegations. Sometimes, if the intake officer decides from the initial description that
the child needs the help of the court, the officer herself will vigorously question
the parent to obtain any other allegations in order to bolster what may otherwise be
a "weak petition." Much the same circumstances prevail in New York, where even
more allegations are usually made in each case than is common in Rockland though
intake officers are less inclined to bolster weak cases.
87. Some 46 percent of the cases are adjusted. The remaining 54 percent were
sent to court. However, the youths in adjusted cases have not necessarily escaped all
effects of court involvement. Those youths suffer a time loss and an intrusion into
their privacy as the intake process is carried out and often (in 54 percent of all
cases; 74 percent of the cases in New York, though only in 16 percent in Rockland)
such youths attend "voluntary" counseling sessions under the threat of a return to court.
88. While statistics are not readily available, observation suggests that such a dy-
namic may be at work in perhaps one in five cases referred to court. It is reflected
in the high percentages of "face-saving" allegations in cases referred to court. For
instance, 88 percent of the cases in which the parent charges the child with dis-
respectful speech are sent to court. Sixty-two percent of the cases in which there are
allegations of refusal to obey go to court. Sixty-four percent of the cases in which
the parent, usually a mother, objects to the daughter's boyfriend and 80 percent of
the cases in which the daughter is charged with being promiscuous go to court.
By contrast, only 50 percent of the cases in which the parent alleges arson or
illegal entry go to court. Fifty-seven percent of the cases in which the parent charges
the child with larceny go to court. See col. 2 of Appendix A infra.
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Once in court, parents often insist on immediate punishment for
their children. The statute interposes no definitional barriers; as
written it makes whatever the child has done unlawful as long as the
parental order was lawful.8 9 Parental passions--"He is such a liar, his
mind is bad and he needs to be put away," said a parent in one case-
are on occasion powerful enough to divert judges and other court
personnel from questioning whether the youth may have been acting
justifiably or lawfully. The court typically responds according to the
parent's wishes.
This response is, of course, difficult to measure statistically; it is
often unwitting; court papers do not note "judge detained youth
because parents so demanded." The degree to which the court func-
tions in response to punitive parental desires can thus be statistically
measured only obliquely, chiefly through examining detention deci-
sions. This is the first major decision the court must make in any un-
governability case.90 Additionally, a comparison can be made of the
judgments and dispositions of youths allegedly ungovernable and
those brought to court by schools and other nonfamilial complainants.
The Family Court Act authorizes detention only when the youth
is likely to abscond or to commit a criminal act.91 The drafting com-
mittee noted in its comments on detention that "[i]f the court is con-
cerned that the respondent will not have a suitable place to stay until
the return date, it should consider whether a neglect petition should
be filed." 92 The statute clearly does not authorize detention when
a parent refuses to take a child home. However, detention is fre-
quently ordered for this reason, in explicit contravention of the
statute: Eleven percent of all detentions are so granted, according to
the written records, and observation suggests that the actual rate may
be close to 50 percent. Moreover, when such punitive detention
occurs, in two out of three cases the youth is placed in a prisonlike
secure facility, a rate of secure detention as high as that for juveniles
who the court fears will commit a criminal act.93
89. See p. 1385 supra.
90. At the close of the first hearing, the court must decide whether to parole or
detain the youth. Otherwise, little business beyond the scheduling of the next ap-
pearance and the assignment of lawyers is transacted.
91. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 739 (McKinney 1963).
92. Id., Comm. Comments.
93. Both secure and nonsecure detention facilities are woefully inadequate and
possibly harmful for the youths in them. Many nonsecure shelters are tremendously
overcrowded. See Note, Nondelinquent Children in New York: The Need for Alternative
to Institutional Treatment, 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoas. 251, 266 (1972). A recent New
York Assembly investigative committee report classified the shelter population as fol.
lows: "[T]wenty percent are mentally disturbed, 10 percent retarded, 3 percent ac-
tively homosexual, 30 percent seriously misbehaved and 10 percent physically handi-
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Thus in many cases a vengeful parent can bypass the intake officer,
have a child brought to court, and compel detention by refusing to
take him home. This may be all that the parent wants from the court
and most parental petitions are withdrawn or dismissed without any
continuing sanction. Even here, however, statistical evidence implies
that bitterness lingers: There is a very low parental withdrawal rate
(in contrast to dismissal by the judge) for many of the allegations that
involve questions of "saving face,"'94 particularly when a daughter
is charged with sexual misbehavior, a highly sensitive and emotional
matter for both parents and judges.95
C. Ungovernability Jurisdiction: Failure in General
Finally, a general survey of ungovernability processing reveals that
the court's assessments are frequently inaccurate, its dispositions usu-
ally provide little effective treatment, and the long-term effects on a
youth and his family are often negative. The inaccuracies in assess-
ment are evident in the illogical patterns of decisions concerning
which cases to adjust, whom to detain, which cases are serious enough
to merit formal adjudication, and what dispositions are appropriate.
At intake, the seriousness of the allegations bears little relation to
whether a case is adjusted or referred to court.96 Rather, the decision
capped." N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1973, at 35, col. 8. The committee substantiated reports
that youths at the facility were confronted with "homosexual attacks, sexual solici-
tation, extortion and homicide," id., and depicted the facility "as a place from which
youngsters easily sortie to commit muggings and return 'bedecked' in stolen finery
and from which youths once left to perpetrate a rape and a murder." Id., Dec. 14,
1973, at 51, col. 1.
As for secure facilities, a recent case mandating massive changes in programs found
the following conditions: Youths were locked up as punishment even though the PINS
youths had not harmed anyone; staffs were too small and inadequately trained; there
was no bona fide effort to treat the detained youths. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp.
575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The officials in charge of both secure and nonsecure facilities in
New York City admit that the poor conditions in them harm the youths. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 4, 1973, at 86, col. 1. For a lengthy discussion of facilities and programs, see
id., Apr. 4, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
94. For instance parents withdrew no petitions in which they had alleged an un-
desirable boyfriend, though the court dismissed fully 60 percent of such cases. Only
24 percent of petitions alleging late hours were withdrawn, though 47 percent were
dismissed; only 22 percent of the petitions alleging a bad companion were withdrawn,
though 56 percent were dismissed; none of the petitions alleging verbal abuse were
withdrawn, though 50 percent were dismissed; only 29 percent of the petitions al-
leging overnight absence were withdrawn, though 41 percent were dismissed.
95. In cases in which there were allegations of sexual misbehavior against a girl,
parents withdrew only 13 percent of the petitioned cases while they withdrew 48
percent of those cases in which they made no such allegations. Cf. note 83 supra.
96. None of the cases alleging shoplifting, possession of a dangerous weapon, or
burglary were referred to court. The charge of having a boyfriend objectionable to
parents (64 percent referred to court) is treated more seriously than the charge of
larceny (57 percent referred to court). Verbal abuse (100 percent referred to court)
is treated more seriously than assault (73 percent referred to court). Refusal to obey
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to adjust an ungovernability case is principally a result of seemingly
irrelevant secondary factors. 7
Detention decisions in the course of court processing also demon-
strate a lack of logic and an apparent disregard of the nature of the
youth's problems and needs. Detention is more likely to occur in
cases involving relatively minor allegations of ungovernable behavior
than in cases involving more serious runaway and assault charges.9s
The overwhelming majority of detained youths are sent to secure fa-
cilities irrespective of the seriousness of the alleged actions. 9 And
the reasons the court gives in support of its decision in selecting se-
cure or nonsecure facilities suggest that considerations other than the
problems and needs of the particular youth govern the decisionmak-
ing at this stage of processing. 100
Formal adjudications also fail to reflect the seriousness of the alle-
gations.' 0 ' Sexual misbehavior is treated with greater concern than
(62 percent referred to court) and coming home late (59 percent referred to court)
are treated more seriously than arson and illegal entry (50 percent of each referred
to court). See col. 2 of Appendix A infra.
97. In New York, regression analysis reveals four factors which predict nearly half
of the outcomes at intake. A petition is more likely to be referred to court if: (1) the
juvenile is neglected; (2) he is relatively older; (3) grandparents live in the home (as
contrasted to stepparents or paramours); (4) a single parent is the primary custodian.
In Rockland, 41 percent of intake decisions are explained by four factors. The like-
lihood of referral to court is increased if: (1) there is an allegation of criminal ac-
tivity (interestingly, most of these criminal allegations are dropped from the actual
petition once a case gets to court); (2) there are grandparents (as opposed to step-
parents or paramours); (3) there is no allegation of short runaway; (4) there is no
allegation of verbal abuse.
98. For example, in cases involving such minor allegations as verbal abuse and
undesirable companions, the detention rates are 57 percent and 55 percent respectively.
In cases involving more serious charges like assault, malicious mischief, and robbery,
the detention rates are 14 percent, 25 percent, and zero percent, respectively. See col.
4 of Appendix A infra for the rate of detention for each allegation.
Regression analysis to determine factors that predict detention reveals that detention
is more likely if: (1) there is no allegation of a long runaway; (2) stepparents or
paramours live in the household; (3) there is an allegation of underage use of alcohol.
99. Of all ungovernable youths, 68 percent are sent to secure facilities and 32
percent are held in nonsecure facilities. Yet in New York County 57 percent of de.
tainees for whom there are ultimately findings (presumably the more serious cases)
are held in nonsecure facilities, while only 43 percent are held in secure facilities.
The obverse of this anomalous pattern is of course also manifest for those for whom
there are no findings: Sixty percent of these detained youths are held in secure facilities.
100. For example, when the official reason for detention is fear that the youth
will abscond (see p. 1396 supra), 20 percent of the youths are detained in nonsecure,
effectively open facilities, as are 33 percent of those detained as a danger to others.
The latter percentage is the same as that of youths detained because their parents
refuse to take them home. See p. 1396 supra. A regression analysis to determine
factors affecting the choice of detention facility indicates that two factors explain 51
percent of the outcomes: Secure detention is more likely if (1) family income is low,
and (2) the juvenile is neglected.
101. For instance, there was no adjudication in the one case involving robbery or
in the four cases involving malicious mischief. One of 11 long runaway cases received
a formal adjudication. In contrast, the adjudication rates for cases involving more minor
allegations are high: short runaways, 52 percent; vile language, 60 percent; verbal
abuse, 71 percent; undesirable boyfriend, 57 percent. See col. 5 of Appendix A infra.
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criminal acts.' 0: Moreover, a case that has advanced this far in the
process is almost automatically adjudicated. 03 Chance and endurance
are thus critical. Adjudications are more likely if parents do not
weary of court hearings, the youth does not outgrow the court's juris-
diction, and the law guardian does not persuade parent and child to
accept a "voluntary" referral.
When the court eventually decides upon an "appropriate" dispo-
sition,10 4 the degree of regulation and service it mandates for the youth
often seems an incongruously small return on the court's investment
of time t oa and labor, especially in light of the imposition upon the
youth and his family. After lengthy processing, two-thirds of the cases
are withdrawn or dismissed.' 06 Moreover, the disposition ultimately
reached often appears to be inappropriate, given the allegations made
and previous court involvement. 10
7
Those who are subject to some type of regulating disposition are
not thereby greatly benefitted. The primary disposition received by
the majority of regulated youths is some form of generally ineffec-
102. Fifty percent of the cases in which there are allegations of sexual misbe-
havior are adjudicated; in contrast, only 36 percent of cases in which there are
criminal allegations are adjudicated.
103. In 69 percent of cases, the youth admits the allegations against him in full;
in 24 percent the youth admits the allegations against him in part. Thus, in only
7 percent of cases is there a denial of the allegations.
104. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Act § 711(b) (McKinney 1963).
105. The average time span from intake to disposition in an ungovernability
case is 143 days.
106. Overall, 38 percent are withdrawn and 28 percent are dismissed.
107. A regression analysis exploring factors determinative of nonregulating and
regulating dispositions indicates that the following factors explain 62 percent of the
variance. A nonregulating disposition is more likely if: (1) family income is low;
(2) the juvenile is charged with malicious mischief; (3) he is not charged with assault;
(4) a stepparent or paramour (rather than a grandparent) is also living in the household.
Several of the above factors that are predictive of nonregulating dispositions are
also highly predictive of a youth's referral to court. See note 97 supra. Probation
intake decisions and court dispositional decisions operate at irrational cross-purposes:
Those factors at intake which are typically associated with a case sent to court are
the same factors that characterize cases which are withdrawn or dismissed.
When the allegations in the petition are compared with the youth's disposition, it
is evident that serious allegations do not receive proportionately serious dispositions,
while less serious allegations receive far more regulating dispositions than they would
appear to warrant. For example, all of the long runaway cases are withdrawn or
dismissed, but only 61 percent of short runaways receive such nonregulating dis-
positions. Eighty-six percent of the drug possession cases are withdrawn or dismissed;
lesser percentages of cases involving undesirable companions, vile language, verbal
abuse, staying out overnight, late hours, truancy, and refusal to obey also are allotted
such nonregulating dispositions. Such cases are thus more closely regulated by the
court than drug abuse. See Appendix B infra.
Such dispositions also seem illogical in light of previous court involvement. Overall,
65 percent of the youths whose cases are dismissed had previous court involvements
(as do 20 percent of youths whose cases are withdrawn). On the other hand, none
of those sent to training school or given probation had previous court contact and
60 percent of those placed in private agencies had no previous court contact.
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tive'08 probation supervision. 10 9 Of the more highly regulating dis-
positions, private agency placement, the most desired, is available
primarily on a discriminatory basis; 1 0 and its value once attained
is open to question."' Nonsecure state facilities, frequently dispensed
as next-best alternatives, are likewise of dubious value."12 Training
schools are a last resort." 3
108. Probation usually involves merely perfunctory checkups. Probation departments
are handicapped by limited manpower. New programs such as Alternatives to Deten-
tion and the Urban League's probation program in New York City have the un-
fortunate effect of draining the better probation officers from regular programs.
Interview with Polly Whitney, Social Worker, Juv. Rights Div. of the Legal Aid
Soc'y, N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City, Aug. 29, 1973. Moreover, in other states,
even new probation programs have proven unsuccessful. For instance, in a three year
experimental program designed to improve the effectiveness of its parole (probation)
program, the California Youth Authority attempted intensive rehabilitative supervision
instead of the regular program. The result was negative: "Perhaps the most out-
standing finding was that there were no significant differences between the experi-
mental and regular parole (probation) programs in either project area on any of the
parole performance criterion measures." Delinquency Control Project of the California
Youth Authoritv, Summer Report, 1973, at iii. See Note, Persons in Need of Super-
vision: Is There a Constitutional Right to Treatment?, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 624, 638-39
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Right to Treatment].
109. Ten percent of the youths are given probation, 7 percent suspended judgment
and 2 percent informal supervision. A total of 19 percent thus receive a disposition
in which they are monitored by a probation officer.
110. Probation officers acknowledge it is more difficult to place minority youths in
private agencies, even when both the probation officer and the judge feel that this
disposition is most appropriate. Interview with Michael Frenchak, Supervisor of the
Juv. Section of Probation, Rockland County Family Ct., June 26, 1973. Private agen-
cies retain considerable veto power over the admission of ungovernable youths to
their services. This veto is often exercised to separate youths on racial and religious
grounds. In a recent suit brought by the Civil Liberties Union and the Legal Aid
Society, seventy-seven children's services agencies in New York City and State joined
in a consent decree in which the agencies acknowledged that "the religion-based
system of placing children in need of help in New York City and State has the
effect of discriminating against black Protestant youngsters." N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1974,
1, at 68, col. 1. In a stipulation approved by U.S. District Judge Harold R. Tyler,
r., the parties agreed that current practices had "the effect of depriving black
Protestant and other children of necessary and proper services by denying them ap-
propriate care." Id. See Right to Treatment, supra note 108, at 642-43.
111. Indeed many youths who are brought to court have already had unsuccessful
involvements with such private agencies. A study of PINS youths (including ungovern-
ables) found that 65 percent of the sample had had prior contacts with social agencies
and a special bureau of the Board of Education, 28 percent had been in voluntary
counseling, and 22 percent had attended a mental health clinic or had been treated
at a psychiatric hospital before being brought to court on PINS charges. OCS; Plethora,
supra note 64, at 36. Moreover, the Council of Voluntary Child Care Agencies re-
ported last year with regard to such placements that "there is practically no ac-
countability on effectiveness." N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1973, at 57, col. 1. The Council,
through its assistant executive director, Mrs. King, noted that children "who remain
in placement a long time tend to have a poor self-image, to be dependent, hostile,
bitter toward their families and society, [and] have higher levels of anxiety about
their future in the world." Id.
112. New York State Controller Arthur Levitt charged recently that resident re-
habilitation programs operated by the Division For Youth for PINS and delinquents
provided the youths with "spotty education, little or no psychiatric care and, in some
instances, inadequate living accommodations." N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1973, § 1, at 49, col.
1; cf. Right to Treatment, supra note 108, at 644.
113. Judges feel training schools provide inadequate rehabilitation and are re-
luctant to send youths to them. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1973, at 32, col. 5. Milton Luger,
Director of the State's Division For Youth and responsible for the training schools,
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In the end most court processing is of limited utility. It effects
little positive change for most youths, many of whom will soon.reap-
pear at intake with the same complainant and similar allegations." 4
In other instances, the dispositions serve only to generate further
business for the court.115 And whatever the dispositional outcome
its value is eroded by various long-term aftereffects. For example,
the research literature on stigma has proven the extent to which
juvenile court adjudications tend to alter the juvenile's image not
only in the eyes of others, but also in his own eyes; his changed per-
ception of himself as "tarnished" and less valued than others is ac-
companied in the long run by a loss of respect for the institutions
of law and authority in general. 116
admits they are "irrelevant" and that their staffs "don't know how to work effectively
with kids." Id. See Right to Treatment, supra note 108, at 639-42. In an effort to
avoid sending New York youths for whom private agency placements cannot be
found to such institutions, courts often send them instead to the Commissioner of
Social Services. They are then detained (see discussion of detention facilities at note
93 supra) for periods of several months while fresh attempts at placements with the
same agencies are made for them. Interview with A.H. Gross, N.Y. County Branch
Chief (West) for Investigation and Supervision of the N.Y.C. Probation Department,
in New York City, July 6, 1973. See Right to Treatment, supra note 108, at 643-44.
Cf. OCS; Plethora, supra note 64, at 58-61.
114. In 33 percent of the cases, youths have subsequent court contacts. Seventeen
percent of the youths have subsequent court contacts as ungovernables; of these, seven
cases, 32 percent, involve the same complainant as in the original ungovernability
case. Moreover, the pattern of allegations in these subsequent ungovernability cases
resembles the pattern of the original intake ungovernable allegations: For example,
46 percent of the later petitions also allege short runaways, 14 percent also allege
assault, and 9 percent also allege a variety of "other" charges.
115. Of cases which returned, 12 percent did so upon petitions brought by official
personnel asking modification of placement or alleging violation of the terms of pro-
bation. In Rockland, 67 percent of the recidivists were brought in on such petitions;
17 percent came from agencies asking placement modification and 50 percent from
probation officers alleging violations in the terms of probation.
116. When the PINS jurisdiction was developed in 1962 it was hoped that little
or no stigma would accrue to an adolescent because the societal diagnosis, as mani-
fested in the PINS label, was that he should be "helped" and "saved." See p. 1384
supra. It was reasoned that since stigma is a result of a process by which society
identifies and labels reprehensible behavior and attributes, when the attributes labeled
are less reprehensible, there should be a lesser degree of stigmatization. This is likely
to be true for adults. Adolescents, however, by reason of their state of psychological
development, do not pay much attention to the degree of "reprehensibility" of the
bad things they are accused of. If an adolescent is adjudicated "ungovernable" (in
New York, a "PINS"), he does not care that he is less "bad" than a delinquent.
Rather he focuses on the judgment that he is not normal, not as good as others of
his age. Erik Erikson in detailing his theory of development has remarked of ado-
lescent reasoning:
An adolescent feels that to be a little less of one means to be much more
of the other-or, rather to be a little less of one means to be all of the other.
If . . . something that happens psychosocially marks him . . . he may develop
a deep fixation connected with a negative identity.
DEP'T OF HEW, PUB. No. 56, NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR RE EARCH ON JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY 10 (H. Witmer and K. Kotinsky eds. 1956).
Another aspect of the stigma affixed by juvenile court involvement lies in society's
discrimination against such youths in matters such as jobs. The Family Court Act
contains an effort to ameliorate this problem by protecting records from "indis-
criminate public inspection." Records may not be released without court permission.
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Furthermore, observations suggest that ungovernability proceedings
increase an embattled parent's already heavy burden by emphasizing
the parent as the only source of rationality and competence within
the family unit; by presuming the child helpless and incompetent,
the court process cuts off the strength and support which the child
might bring to the family were he treated as a responsible and con-
tributing member of it. Thus, rather than strengthening the parent-
child relationship in the child's interest, ungovernability jurisdiction
weakens the family and isolates the child-respondent from it.
III. A Basic Flaw
The frequent failures of the ungovernability jurisdiction stem from
the inability of family court judges to exercise their wide discretion
over youths without often serious misassessments. 117 Unlike the prob-
lems of inadequate services and facilities which also plague the court,
this problem is systemic and not susceptible to any simple solution.",,
In ungovernability cases a judge is given problems far more deli-
cate and complex and far less subject to judicial solution than those
in most areas of law.119 He must accurately assess a parent-child con-
N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 766 (McKinney 1963). In fact, however, records are frequently
released to police, armed forces, potential employers, and others. Confidentiality is
thus seriously undermined and prior juvenile court involvement continues to stig-
matize youths in the wider society.
For a detailed analysis of stigmatization in the context of the juvenile court, see
A. Mahoney, Youths in the Juvenile Justice System: Some Questions about Empirical
Support for Labeling Theory, 1973 (Working Paper, ABA-IJA Juvenile Justice Standards
Project).
117. Most judges and the Office of Children's Services of the State Judicial Con-
ference insist to the contrary that the problems with the jurisdiction stem primarily
from a lack of services and generally inadequate financial resources. Interview with
Administrative Judge Florence Kelley of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City,
Aug. 8, 1973; cf. OCS; Plethora, supra note 64.
118. It is important to remember that, while a vast inflow of funds would no
doubt improve staffing and physical conditions at the various facilities which the court
relies on, such improved conditions would not necessarily guarantee the effectiveness
of the services. Science is still unable to predict accurately what will cure the problems
of youths enmeshed in complex parent-child conflicts. Hence, it is an open question
whether even an inflow of funds would enable these institutions to surmount limita-
tions of human insight so that the youths sent to them would leave in a state sub-
stantially less detrimental to their interests, see p. 1385 & note 22 supra, than similar
but "untreated" youths. Professor David Fanshel, Director of the Child Welfare Re-
search Program, Columbia University School of Social Work, has conducted an ex-
tensive longitudinal study of the effects of child care institutions upon children. His
results, still being analyzed, will provide valuable evidence of the value of institu-
tionalization. Letter from David Fanshel to R.H. Andrews, Jr., Apr. 15, 1974, on
file with the Yale Law Journal.
119. They are, for example, unlike those which typically occur between contracting
parties or between a tortfeasor and victim in that they are of vastly greater duration,
intimacy, complexity, and (frequently) emotional intensity. A judge is thus presented
with a more multifaceted problem than in other areas of law (with the possible ex.
ception of divorce law in some states; see Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds
for Divorce: A Model Statute and Commentary, 3 FAMILY L.Q. 75 (1969)) when he is
1402
Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction
flict and determine what kind of "help" the child involved may need.
To permit the judge to understand and cope with problems of such
intricacy, the statute gives him vast discretion with respect to what
information he is to consider relevant 120 and it sets no standards for
decisionmaking in order to avoid compromising this task.
121
However, in a court process which by its nature exists to decide
cases, the absence of standards leaves a void as to how decisions should
be made. In some cases, fortunately, the process works as intended:
Because of the latitude which he is allowed, the judge is able to assess
accurately the youth and family before him. In many other cases,
the judge in the absence of standards falls back, though often un-
wittingly and with the best intentions, upon personal feelings and
predilections in making his decisions. He is, moreover, left vulnerable
to inappropriate influences from court personnel and parents.
The ungovernability jurisdiction affords less protection against the
intrusion of the judge's personal predilections than do other legal
proceedings that consider narrower issues;'-2 and because the persons
dealt with are youths, the personal predilections of judges as adult
decisionmakers are more likely to be subject to inaccuracies and mis-
conceptions. Youths are often seen as less than full persons, 2 3 whose
problems judges and adults generally assume are easily understood'24
and readily remedied. 2 Judges are also more likely to universalize
told to assess and ameliorate the situation "in the child's best interests." Cf. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 8: "[L]aw is incapable of effectively managing, except in a very
gross sense, so delicate and complex a relationship as that between parent and child."
120. The discretion derives from the fact that anything more than "a single iso-
lated incident" of disobedience will suffice for a finding that a juvenile is a PINS. See
note 51 supra. The judge is given no standards as to what might constitute reasonable
and lawful parental behavior or how dispositions should be matched with specific
problems.
121. As Judge Dembitz noted in 1962:
It is the broad discretion in both phases of the proceeding-both in adjudicating
whether the child is within the court's jurisdiction as well as in his disposition-
which gives the judge an extraordinary and troubling degree of power over
children who are before the court though they have not broken any law.
Dembitz, supra note 14, at 508.
122. The judge has less scope for the play of personal predilection in considering
whether a particular youth did or did not rob a person at a certain time as alleged
in a delinquency proceeding than in considering whether a youth in conflict with
his parents should be adjudicated ungovernable.
123. Cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 22, at 3.
124. The following diagnosis offered by a family court judge is instructive: "She
thinks she's a pretty hot number; I'd be worried about leaving my kid with her
in a room alone. She needs to get her mind off boys." In-chambers observation of a
judge of the Rockland County Family Ct., June 26, 1973.
125. Said a judge of one mother-daughter conflict, "She's way too big for her
pants and that's putting it nicely . . . [;] what she needs is a good spanking."
Observation of a judge of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City, June 29, 1973.
Since childhood and adolescence are universal human experiences, judges and pro-
bation officers may feel that they "know" a great deal about them and that they
can "cure" whatever maladies arise. A parallel attitude is manifested toward mar-
riage by judges in divorce cases. See Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 119.
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unconsciously their own experiences and standards with juveniles
than with adults; 126 the consequence is a foreclosing of receptivity
to the individual juvenile's particular social and personal circum-
stances. 127 In addition, most judges, like other adults, possess an un-
conscious ambivalence toward youths.128
The intrusion of personal feelings and predilections is exemplified
in the presumption by some judges that the youth must be the erring
party if a family conflict exists' 29 because a child owes obedience to
parents under all circumstances. This presumption is discernible in
the language of the statute, which proscribes as ungovernable any
juvenile behavior that contravenes a lawful parental command. 30
Only certain favorable middle class characteristics-a high I.Q.,131
diligence in keeping appointments, deference to judicial authority-
can lighten the burden of this presumption.
The absence of standards leaves the decisionmaking process in un-
governability cases vulnerable as well to the pressures of some adults
who may not be fully devoted to the individual respondent's welfare.
Such pressure may come in subtle form, as in the power exercised
126. Attitudes towards sexual activity are a prime example of this. A typical ju-
dicial comment on fourteen-year-old girls is that at that age girls "get some crazy
ideas. They want to fool around with men, and that's sure as hell trouble." Interview
with a judge of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City, July 27, 1973.
127. Thus, the authors witnessed a judge at an intake hearing who, after no
more than a cursory consideration of the allegations and without any consideration
of other factors in the case, told one girl:
I want you to grow up to be a fine young lady. But you must obey your
mother-legally, morally, and in every other way she is your mother, and you
must do what she tells you. Because if you go wrong, she's the first one who's
blamed.
Statement of a judge of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City, Aug. 17, 1973.
128. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 22, at 106.
129. Charged one judge upon paroling a girl in her first hearing:
I want you to promise me to obey your mother, to have perfect school at-
tendance and not miss a day of school, to give up these people who are trying
'to lead you to do wrong, not to hang out in candy stores or tobacco shops or
street corners where these people are, and to be in when your mother says: if it's
6:00 it's 6:00, if it's 7:00 it's 7:00, if it's 8:00 it's 8:00, but by 9:00 1 don't want
to see you on the streets of this city except with your parents or with your
clergyman or to get a doctor. Do you understand?
Yes.
Statement of a judge of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City, Aug. 17, 1973.
Another judge said that, even if he dismisses a case as unjustified (which happens
very rarely), he gives the youth a stern talking to: "I want him to benefit from his
exposure to the court." Conversation with a judge of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New
York City, July 24, 1973.
130. See p. 1385 supra.
131. For instance, there is a clear trend in detention decisions; those not detained
tend to have higher I.Q.'s. Data in New York makes it apparent that those with
findings are overwhelmingly those with lower I.Q.'s; judges are willing to give a
brighter youth a break on the theory that he "might really become something." And,
finally, the more regulating dispositions go to those with lower I.Q.'s.
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by groups of court personnel,132 or in more blatant form, as in the
influence angry parents have upon decisions. 133 In either case, such
pressure has greater impact than it would if adults instead of youths
were the respondents.
IV. Abolition and Its Consequences
Judicial processing of ungovernable youths has severe failings the
causes of which are probably irremediable. It would be less detrimen-
tal for youths if they were dealt with, where appropriate, as delin-
quent or neglected, or indeed if they were not dealt with at all. The
ungovernability jurisdiction should be abolished.
Were such a step taken, jurisdiction could of course be retained
over those youths, now processed as ungovernable, who are in fact
criminal or neglected. This step would afford delinquent youth the
constitutional protections to which they are currently entitled. 3 4 It
would also probably yield an increase in services for neglected
youths.' 3 5
Jurisdiction over youths who resort to force against a parent would
also not be lost. Indeed, such youths are now subject to adjudication
as "family offenders"'. 36 just as adults are 3 7 when they resort to
physical force during a family controversy. Though this provision is
little used because of the easy availability of the ungovernability
132. Both New York and Rockland observation indicates that one group of court
personnel dominates the processing of a case and thereby strongly influences judges'
decisions in accord with its own institutional and ideological biases. In Rockland, this
group is the probation department. In the absence of "resident" attorneys (law guard-
ians in Rockland are simply appointed members of the County bar), probation of-
ficers are able to control what information is amassed and what is presented both
to the judge and to the law guardian representing the respondent.
In New York, law guardians (a group of young attorneys who are "resident" in
the Court and are retained by the city from the Juvenile Rights Division of the
Legal Aid Society) are the dominant force. They influence case outcomes by effective
preemption of such tasks as gathering detailed information on the respondent juvenile
prior to a finding and making postpetition pretrial conciliation attempts and also by
their ability to manipulate influence factors in the judicial process, e.g., which judge
hears which cases. Since their acknowledged preference is strongly against any PINS
jurisdiction, far fewer cases in New York actually come to an adjudication than in
Rockland (fewer than 25 percent in contrast to over C0 percent in Rockland). In both
jurisdictions, therefore, the statutory model of the judge as central decisionmaker
with unfettered access to impartial information is unrealized.
133. See pp. 1394-97 supra.
134. See pp. 1393-94 supra.
135. See p. 1393 supra.
136. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 812 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74).
137. The family court may now waive those accused of a family offense to the
Criminal Court. Id. § 816. This provision presumably does not and would not apply
to youths under sixteen; rather, youths would be subject to a delinquency petition
should the court decide that the reconciliative aims of the family offense jurisdiction
were inappropriate.
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jurisdiction, in the absence of that jurisdiction there is no reason
why this provision could not be invoked whenever appropriate.
However, noncriminal, nonneglected youths simply brought to court
for "help" in the wake of disagreements with their parents would not,
of course, receive the court's help. Rather, family members would
have to fall back upon their own personal resources and upon the
range of community resources that often go underutilized 13 in the
rush to bring children to court.
There are, of course, a few youths who need help and who might
not receive it from other sources.' 39 But it must be remembered that
many of the ungovernability cases which come to court involve issues
of passing rather than ultimate significance 140 in the lives of youths
138. In Rockland County, for example, the Volunteer Counseling Service accepts
referrals from the court on a "voluntary" basis of youths and their parents for coun-
seling on family problems. Judges note, however, that parents seldom attend more
than one counseling session before returning to the court, which they find better suited
to their purposes. Interview with a judge of the N.Y. Family Ct., in New York City,
Aug. 2, 1973.
139. Indeed, it is widely believed that untreated ungovernables are almost certain
to become delinquents. "PINS behavior, especially among boys, is seen as the harbinger
of crime, demonstrating a proclivity for 'bad' behavior. . . . The detection of a
.proclivity to bad behavior' is facilitated by the court's 'treatment process.'" Silver,
The New York City Family Court: A Law Guardian's Overview, 18 CRIME 9- DELINQ.
93, 95 (1972). Though persistent, the view that the ungovernability jurisdiction serves
as an accurate early warning system for apprehending children in an incipient "pre-
delinquent" phase before they actually commit a delinquent act, and thus prevents
them from committing such acts by providing court supervision and treatment, has
largely been scientifically discredited.
Neither the predictive nor the preventive abilities of the jurisdiction bear up under
critical scrutiny. First, there is no consensus as to what behavior is included in the
category "predelinquent." Since a delinquent is a young person apprehended and
convicted of a criminal act, the profile of delinquent category is the result not only
of individual acts and characteristics, but also of law enforcement practices. A "pre-
delinquent" youth might, therefore, be someone "on the verge of committing a crimi-
nal act," or "on the verge of getting caught and convicted for a criminal act." Second,
even if there were consensus on the content of the category, there is no empirical
data to support the notion that "predelinquency" status may accurately be predicted
by techniques available in connection with ungovernability jurisdiction or by any
other means. E. SCHUR, RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION: RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY
PROBLEM 46-51 (1973). Extensive retrospective analyses of high school and college
students who had repeatedly disobeyed their parents during their younger years
clearly demonstrate that these individuals seldom became delinquent and presently are
leading law-abiding lives. Legal Action Support Project of the Bureau of Social Science
Research, Research Memorandum on "Status Offenders," March 1972, at 22. And in
a major recent test of the "predelinquency" predictive theory, psychiatrists and social
workers attempted to predict which adolescents would become delinquents. The back-
ground factors on which the predictions were based were similar to those that are
often important in ungovernability cases. The results clearly indicated an inability
to predict accurately: The predictions were incorrect more than 50 percent of the
time. E. ScHUR, supra, at 47.
140. Many sorts of behavior for which youths are brought to court as ungovernable
are considered normal and healthy by child psychologists. For example, Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit write that "revolt against any parental authority is normal devel-
opmentally since it is the adolescent's way towards establishing his own independent
adult identity." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 22, at 34. See the discussion of intake allega.
tions, supra note 33, and col. I of Appendix A infra.
1406
Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction
who are often competent enough to care for themselves. 141 Further-
more, the failure to save a few unfortunate youths must be measured
against the law's known and unavoidable negative consequences: the
detention of youths in admittedly dangerous and deteriorated facilities
for sorts of behavior that may be perfectly legal and sensible; the viola-
tion of the rights of youths who should be processed as delinquent
and the isolation from available services of youths who should be
processed as neglected; the illogical results of a court process vesting
vast discretion in the hands of judges who are unable to exercise it
without abuse; the increased intrafamily hostility that the process en-
genders in the short run; and the stigma sufered by youths as well as
the negative attitude toward law and authority they develop in the
long run. Juveniles should be "saved," of course, and "saving" them
becomes an emotional issue whose lure no adult can easily ignore.
But it is also important that the adolescents who in fact come before
the court as allegedly ungovernable not be harmed' as documented in
this Note; the cost of such harm far exceeds any benefit that would
be lost as a consequence of abolition of the jurisdiction.
141. Of youths now processed under the ungovernability jurisdiction, 67 percent
are over fourteen and 44 percent are over fifteen. See note 25 supra for a discussion
of age. Many of the more serious allegations are even more highly concentrated
among older youths. For example, at intake, 77 percent of the long runaway allega-
tions concern youths over fourteen and 69 percent concern youths over fifteen. See
note 41 supra.
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O The dispositions of some petition allegations (listed in column 3 of Appendix A) are not
reported in this table because the cases had not reached dispositions at the time of this study.
t Four percent of the short runaway allegations were disposed of by informal supervision.
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